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Abstract 
Can a transfer of wealth from the US to least developed countries be Pareto improving? 
We analyze this question in an open-economy innovation-driven growth model, in which the 
high-income (low-income) country produces innovative (homogenous) goods. We find that 
wealth redistribution to the low-income country simultaneously reduces global inequality and 
stimulates innovation through an increase in labor supply in the high-income country. Given that 
the market equilibrium of R&D-growth models is usually inefficient due to R&D externalities, 
the wealth redistribution may lead to a Pareto improvement, which occurs if the discount rate is 
sufficiently low or R&D productivity is sufficiently high. 
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To require the President to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to 
further the United States foreign policy objective of promoting the reduction of 
global poverty, the elimination of extreme global poverty, and the achievement of 
the Millennium Development Goal of reducing by one-half the proportion of 
people worldwide, between 1990 and 2015, who live on less than $1 per day. 
Global Poverty Act of 2007 
 
1. Introduction 
A recent report by the World Bank shows that about 1.4 billion people live in extreme poverty as 
of 2005.1 The World Bank defines extreme poverty as living on less than US$1.25 per day 
meaning that the victims of extreme poverty are often unable to meet basic needs for food, water, 
shelter, sanitation, and health care.2 Some economists have proposed increasing anti-poverty aid 
from developed countries to reduce global poverty. For example, Sachs (2005) urges developed 
countries, such as the US, to set aside 0.7 percent of the gross national product for global poverty 
reduction. However, critiques are sometimes outraged by the potential tax burden on the 
citizens.3 The purpose of this study is to show that this kind of global wealth redistribution may 
be Pareto improving through innovation and economic growth. 
This paper develops an open-economy innovation-driven growth model to analyze the 
effects of cross-country wealth redistribution on innovation, economic growth and global welfare. 
Specifically, we extend the canonical quality-ladder model into a two-country setting. The high-
income country (e.g. the US) produces innovative goods while the low-income country produces 
homogenous goods. Within this framework, a transfer of wealth to the low-income country 
stimulates innovation through an increase in labor supply in the high-income country. Intuitively, 
the wealth transfer increases the marginal utility of wealth of households in the high-income 
country and hence reduces their consumption of leisure. Therefore, when the high-income 
                                                 
1 For more information, see http://go.worldbank.org/CUQLLRX1Q0. 
2 See, for example, Sachs (2005) for an excellent discussion on the problems of poverty in developing countries. 
3 See, for example, Cline (2008) and Schlafly (2008). 
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country owns a major share of wealth in the world, redistribution can simultaneously reduce 
global wealth inequality and increase growth through elastic labor supply. Given that the market 
equilibrium of R&D-based growth models is usually inefficient due to R&D externalities, the 
redistribution may improve both countries’ welfare. We show that a Pareto improvement occurs 
if the discount rate is sufficiently low or R&D productivity is sufficiently high. 
International transfers have been an important issue in international economics, and 
previous studies (to be discussed below) mostly focus on its welfare effects through trade. While 
the static trade effects are undoubtably important and have received careful analysis, the present 
study highlights the importance of a dynamic welfare effect of international transfers through 
growth. For this purpose, it is necessary to consider a growth-theoretic framework. Furthermore, 
the US is one of the countries at the world technology frontier so that innovation is arguably the 
most important channel to achieve sustainable growth. Therefore, we consider a model in which 
growth is driven by innovation. Also, there is supportive empirical evidence for a negative 
relationship between wealth and labor supply, which is the key mechanism behind the results of 
the present study.4 
This paper also relates to the issue of R&D underinvestment. Empirical studies often find 
that the social return to R&D is much higher than the private return.5 Jones and Williams (1998, 
2000) apply these empirical estimates to an R&D-based growth model and find that the socially 
optimal level of R&D is at least two to four times higher than the market level. Therefore, 
overcoming this market failure of R&D underinvestment would stimulate innovation, increase 
R&D towards the social optimum and achieve a higher level of social welfare. Featuring this 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) for a useful summary of empirical studies that find a 
negative relationship between wealth and labor supply. They also emphasize the importance of elastic labor supply 
on income inequality in the AK growth model, but wealth redistribution does not affect growth in their model. 
5 See Griliches (1992) for a review on this literature. 
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prominent market distortion, the R&D-based growth model with elastic labor supply is a suitable 
framework for analyzing the distortion-correcting effect of international transfers. 
In the trade literature on international transfers, it is well-known since Samuelson (1947) 
that if there is no distortion and the equilibrium is stable, then the donating (aid-receiving) 
country must be worse off (better off). In the presence of distortions, Bhagwati et al. (1983) and 
others show that the donating (aid-receiving) country may become better off (worse off), and this 
phenomenon is known as the transfer paradox. Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988) consider a 
multilateral transfer and show that a Pareto improvement may occur but only if tariff distortions 
exist. The present study relates to these seminal studies by considering R&D underinvestment as 
a dynamic distortion that is inherent in the US economy and can be corrected by international 
transfers. In an overlapping generations (OLG) model, Galor and Polemarchakis (1987) show 
that the transfer paradox may occur due to the finite planning horizon of agents.6 Shimomura 
(2007) relates Pareto-improving foreign aid to indeterminacy in a dynamic North-South model 
while Benarroch and Gaisford (2004) consider Pareto-improving foreign aid in a product-cycle 
model with exogenous innovation. The present study differs from these studies by analyzing the 
roles of endogenous innovation and R&D underinvestment on Pareto-improving transfers. 
This paper also relates to the literature on inequality and growth.7 The early studies of 
this literature focus on the effects of inequality on physical and human capital accumulation. For 
example, Bertola (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) find that 
when inequality leads to redistribution through some political mechanism, the higher tax on 
capital income is detrimental to growth. In contrast, Galor and Zeira (1993) and Aghion and 
Bolton (1997) find that in the presence of credit constraints, redistribution may stimulate capital 
                                                 
6 Cremers and Sen (2008) take into account transition dynamics and show that the possibility of a transfer paradox in 
the OLG model is robust. 
7 See Bertola et al. (2006) for an excellent textbook treatment of this literature. 
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accumulation. In a model in which growth is initially driven by physical capital and subsequently 
by human capital, Galor and Moav (2004) show that inequality increases (decreases) growth in 
the early (later) stages of development. While these studies focus on the effects of inequality on 
capital accumulation, the present study is related to a more recent sub-literature that analyzes the 
effects of inequality on innovation-driven growth. In this literature, the different channels 
through which inequality affects growth can be broadly assigned to two categories (a) supply of 
factor inputs for R&D and (b) demand for innovative goods (to be discussed below). Although 
the present study considers a two-country model, the global economy can also be viewed as a 
single country and the two countries can be relabeled as two types of households, who supply 
different labor inputs and own different shares of national wealth. In this case, redistribution 
across countries is isomorphic to redistribution across households. 
Chou and Talmain (1996) develop a variety-expanding model with elastic labor supply 
and show that if and only if the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption differs 
from unity, wealth redistribution across households would affect growth through aggregate labor 
supply. While Chou and Talmain (1996) provide an early and interesting analysis on the effects 
of wealth redistribution on innovation-driven growth and social welfare, they point out that the 
growth rate and labor supply become non-stationary in their model under a non-unitary elasticity 
of substitution between leisure and consumption. In other words, wealth redistribution having an 
effect on growth is incompatible with balanced growth in the Chou-Talmain model. The present 
study continues to analyze the role of elastic labor supply on inequality and growth but allows 
for different types of labor based on the common perception that it is the supply of high-skill 
labor that contributes to growth. In this more realistic framework, redistribution affects growth 
under the conventional unit elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption. 
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Garcia-Penalosa and Wen (2008) also explore the relationship between redistribution and 
growth through the supply of factor inputs for R&D. In particular, they analyze the effect of risk 
aversion on occupational choice. Their idea is that R&D entrepreneurship is a risky career; thus, 
the insurance effect of redistribution increases growth by providing more incentives for risk-
averse agents to become R&D entrepreneurs. Our study complements Garcia-Penalosa and Wen 
(2008) by analyzing a related effect of redistribution on the supply of R&D labor. 
While the above studies consider the effects of inequality on innovation-driven growth 
through the supply side, some studies analyze the demand side by allowing for non-homothetic 
preferences, e.g. indivisible consumption in Li (1998) and hierarchical preferences in Zweimuller 
(2000) and Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006).8 Zweimuller (2000) considers the market effect of 
inequality (i.e. increasing inequality slows down the growth of market demand for innovative 
goods) and finds that wealth redistribution from wealthy to poor households increases growth. In 
contrast, Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) consider both the market effect and the price effect (i.e. 
increasing inequality allows the innovative goods to be sold at a higher price) and find that the 
price effect dominates the market effect such that wealth redistribution from poor to wealthy 
households increases growth. While the demand-side result from Zweimuller (2000) is consistent 
with the supply-side results from Garcia-Penalosa and Wen (2008) and the present study, the 
result from Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) is not. Therefore, it becomes an empirical question as 
to which effect dominates in reality.9 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
defines the equilibrium and derives the dynamic properties of the balanced-growth path (BGP) 
                                                 
8 Some recent studies, such as Hatipoglu (2008) and Kiedaisch (2008), analyze the effects of patent protection on 
inequality and growth within this growth-theoretic framework of non-homothetic preferences. 
9 See Barro (2000) for a review on empirical studies that find different results on the growth-inequality relationship, 
and Barro also finds that the effects of inequality on growth are different across samples of countries. 
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and the distribution of wealth across countries. Section 4 analyzes the effects of redistribution on 
innovation, growth and welfare. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
The underlying quality-ladder model is based on Grossman and Helpman (1991a).10 We extend 
the Grossman-Helpman model into a simple asymmetric two-country setting, in which the high-
income country produces innovative goods (e.g. skill-intensive manufacturing products) and the 
low-income country produces homogenous goods (e.g. agricultural products). This simple setup 
captures the reality that the level of skill and human capital in the US is higher than in the aid-
receiving least developed countries. Also, we allow the two countries to own different shares of 
global wealth. As for the dynamics, we firstly show that the Euler equation implies a stationary 
distribution of consumption across countries. Then, given this stationary distribution of 
consumption, the aggregate economy always jumps to a unique and stable BGP. Finally, this 
balanced-growth behavior of the aggregate economy implies a stationary distribution of wealth 
across countries. Given that the quality-ladder growth model has been well-studied, the familiar 
components of the model will be briefly described while the new features will be described in 
more details. 
 
 2.1. Households 
There are two countries indexed by a superscript },{ lhj∈ . Country h is the high-income country, 
and country l is the low-income country. There is a unit continuum of representative households 
in each country. Households in country j have a lifetime utility function given by 
                                                 
10 See, also, Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) for the other pioneering studies on the quality-
ladder growth model. 
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(1) ∫∞ − +=
0
)ln(ln. dtCeU jt
j
t
tj lφρ .11 
0>ρ  is the discount rate. jtC  is consumption, and jtl  is leisure. 0>φ  is a preference parameter. 
Each household is endowed with one unit of time to allocate between leisure and labor supply. 
The households maximize utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by  
(2) jtt
j
t
j
t
j
tt
j
t CPWVRV −−+= )1( l& . 
j
tW  is the wage rate in country j. 
j
tV  is the value of assets owned by households in country j. tR  
is the nominal rate of return in the global financial market. tP  is the price of consumption goods 
that are tradable across countries at zero transportation cost for simplicity. The households’ 
consumption-leisure tradeoff is  
(3) jtt
j
t
j
t CPW .φ=l . 
From the households’ intertemporal optimization, the familiar Euler equation is  
(4) ρ−== t
t
t
j
t
j
t r
C
C
C
C && , 
where tttt PPRr /&−≡  is the real interest rate, and lthtt CCC +≡  is global consumption. (4) implies 
that the distribution of consumption across the two countries is stationary. 
 
2.2. Consumption and final goods 
Consumption goods are produced by aggregating final goods from the two countries, and this 
sector is characterized by perfect competition.12 The production function is αα )()( 1 lt
h
tt YYC
−= , 
                                                 
11 The more general iso-elastic utility function ∫ −−= −− dtCeU ttt )1/(]1)[( 1. σσφρ l  also features a unitary elasticity of 
substitution between leisure and consumption. For simplicity, we focus on the more tractable log utility (i.e. 1=σ ). 
12 Due to zero profit and zero transportation cost, it does not matter where consumption goods are produced. 
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where htY  denotes final goods from country h and 
l
tY  denotes final goods from country l. Final 
goods are also tradable subject to zero transportation cost. Final goods of country l are produced 
using domestic labor denoted by tL , and the production function is t
l
t LY = . Again, this sector is 
perfectly competitive, and zero profit implies that the price of ltY  is equal to 
l
tW . As for final 
goods of country h, htY  is produced with a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator over a continuum 
of non-tradable intermediates goods )(iX t  for ]1,0[∈i  given by  
(5) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫1
0
)(lnexp diiXY t
h
t . 
This sector is perfectly competitive, and the producers take the output and input prices as given.  
 
 2.3. Intermediate goods 
Country h produces a unit continuum of non-tradable intermediate goods indexed by ]1,0[∈i . 
Each industry is dominated by a temporary monopolistic leader, who holds a patent on the latest 
invention and dominates the market until the next invention occurs. The production function is  
(6) )()( ,
)( iHziX tx
in
t
t= . 
1>z  is the exogenous size of technological improvement from each invention, and )(int  is the 
number of inventions that have occurred in industry i as of time t. In other words, )(intz  is the 
level of technology in industry i at time t. )(, iH tx  is country h’s production labor in industry i. 
The marginal cost of producing )(iX t  is 
(7) )(, /)(
inh
ttx
tzWiMC = . 
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As commonly assumed in the literature, the current and former industry leaders engage in 
Bertrand competition. The familiar profit-maximizing price for the current leader is a constant 
markup over the marginal cost given by 
(8) )()( ,, . iMCziP txtx = .13 
  
 2.4. R&D 
Denote the value of an invention in industry i as )(~ iVt . Due to the Cobb-Douglas specification in 
(5), the amount of profits is the same across industries (i.e. xx i ππ =)(  for ]1,0[∈i ). As a result, 
tt ViV
~)(~ =  for ]1,0[∈i . Because inventions are the only assets in the model, their aggregate value 
equals the global value of assets owned by all households (i.e. lt
h
ttt VVVV +≡=~ ). The familiar 
no-arbitrage condition for tV  is  
(9) ttttxtt VVVR λπ −+= &, . 
The left-hand side of (9) is the return on this asset. The right-hand side of (9) equals the sum of 
(a) the profit tx,π  generated by this asset, (b) the potential capital gain tV& , and (c) the expected 
capital loss ttVλ  due to creative destruction for which tλ  is the Poisson arrival rate of inventions. 
 In country h, there is a continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by ]1,0[∈k , and they 
hire R&D workers )(, kH tr  to create inventions. The expected profit for entrepreneur k is 
(10) )()()( ,, kHWkVk tr
h
ttttr −= λπ . 
The Poisson arrival rate of inventions for entrepreneur k is )()( ,. kHk trt ϕλ = , where ϕ  is R&D 
productivity. Because of free entry, entrepreneurs earn zero expected profit such that  
                                                 
13 Li (2001) considers a CES production function. In this case, the monopolistic markup can be determined by either 
the quality step size or the elasticity of substitution depending on whether innovations are drastic or non-drastic. 
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(11) htt WV =ϕ . 
This condition determines the allocation of workers between production and R&D in country h. 
 
3. Decentralized equilibrium 
In this section, we define the equilibrium and show that the economy is on a unique and stable 
BGP. The equilibrium is a sequence of prices ∞=0, },,),(,,,,{ tt
l
t
h
ttxt
l
t
h
tt VVViPPWWR  and a sequence 
of allocations ∞=0,, },,,,,,),(),(),(,{ tt
l
t
h
t
l
t
h
tt
l
ttrtxt
h
t CCCLYkHiHiXY ll . In each period,  
a. households in country j choose },{ jt
j
tC l  to maximize (1) taking },,{ tjtt PWR  as given;  
b. competitive consumption-goods firms produce }{ tC  to maximize profit taking prices as 
given; 
c. competitive final-goods firms in country h produce }{ htY  to maximize profit taking prices 
as given; 
d. competitive final-goods firms in country l produce }{ ltY  to maximize profit taking prices 
as given; 
e. the leader of industry i  in country j produces )}({ iX t  and chooses )}(),({ ,, iHiP txtx  to 
maximize profit according to the Bertrand competition and taking }{ htW  as given; 
f. R&D entrepreneur k chooses )}({ , kH tr  to maximize profit taking },{ t
h
t VW  as given;  
g. the market for consumption goods clears such that αα )()( 1 lt
h
tt
l
t
h
t YYCCC
−==+ ; 
h. the market for final goods of country h clears such that txt
h
t HZY ,= , where aggregate 
technology is defined as ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∫ zdiinZ tt ln)(exp 1
0
; 
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i. the market for final goods of country l clears such that t
l
t LY = ; 
j. the labor market in country h clears such that httrtx HH l−=+ 1,, ;  
k. the labor market in country l clears such that lttL l−=1 ; and 
l. the value of national wealth adds up to global wealth such that t
l
t
h
t VVV =+ . 
 
3.1. Dynamics of the aggregate economy 
Define country h’s share of consumption in the world as t
h
ttc CCs /, ≡ . The Euler equation in (4) 
implies that this share is stationary across time (i.e. ctc ss =,  for all t). Given this stationary 
distribution of consumption across countries, we show that the aggregate economy always jumps 
to a unique and stable BGP. Let’s define a new variable tttt VCP /≡Ω .  
 
Lemma 1: The law of motion for tΩ  is given by  
(12) )()1( . ϕραφ +−Ω−+=Ω
Ω
tc
t
t s
&
. 
Proof: See Appendix A.■ 
 
Figure 1 plots (12) and shows that tΩ  must jump to a unique steady state given by  
(13) αφ
ϕρ
−+
+=Ω
cs.1
* . 
Lemma 2 shows that a constant tΩ  implies a constant invention arrival rate tλ . As a result, the 
equilibrium allocation of R&D labor is stationary and aggregate technology grows at a constant 
rate. The aggregate production function is   
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(14) αα )()( 1, ttxtt LHZC
−= , 
where aggregate technology can be re-expressed as  
(15) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∫∫ zdszdiinZ t stt lnexpln)(exp
0
1
0
λ . 
The second equality in (15) uses the law of large numbers. Differentiating the log of (15) with 
respect to time yields the growth rate of aggregate technology given by  
(16) zZZg tttt ln/ λ=≡ & , 
where trt H ,.ϕλ =  is the aggregate arrival rate of inventions. (14) implies that the balanced-
growth rate of consumption is g)1( α− . 
 
Lemma 2: The equilibrium allocation of R&D labor is stationary and aggregate technology 
grows at a constant rate. 
Proof: See Appendix A.■  
 
3.2. Distribution of wealth 
Define country h’s share of global wealth as t
h
ttv VVs /, ≡ . We next show that the distribution of 
wealth across countries is stationary given the aggregate BGP.  
 
Lemma 3: The law of motion for tvs ,  is given by  
(17) ))1(())1(( ,, . ϕφϕαφ −Ω+−−Ω−+= tctvtctv ssss& . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■  
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From (13), *Ω=Ωt . Therefore, (17) is a one-dimensional differential equation that describes the 
potential evolution of tvs ,  given the initial 0,vs . Also, (13) implies 0)1(
*
. >=−Ω−+ ρϕαφ cs , 
so that the dynamic system is characterized by global instability. Therefore, the only solution 
consistent with long-run stability is 0,, vtv ss =  for all t. Although tvs ,  is a state variable, 0,vs  is a 
stationary point by having cs  jump to its appropriate value at time 0.
14 In summary, the wealth 
distribution is stationary and equal to its initial distribution. 
 
4. Effects of wealth redistribution on growth and welfare 
In this section, we firstly derive the equilibrium allocation of R&D labor.15 Then, we examine 
the effects of wealth redistribution implemented by a lump-sum transfer.16 
 
Lemma 4: The equilibrium allocations of leisure and R&D labor in country h are 
(18) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++= ϕ
ρ
φ
φ vh s.1
1
l , 
(19) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+
−= ϕ
ρ
ϕ
ρφφ
v
r
sz
z
H .1
1
11 . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■ 
 
To ensure that 0>rH , we impose a lower bound on R&D productivity.  
Condition R (R&D productivity): ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
++>
1
1
.
z
sv
φφρϕ . 
                                                 
14 This value will be derived in the proof of Lemma 4 in Appendix A. 
15 The proof of Lemma 4 also provides the equilibrium allocations of other key variables. 
16 Financing the transfer through distortionary taxes would naturally lead to additional negative effects that reduce 
the parameter space for Pareto improvements. 
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The properties of equilibrium R&D labor are quite intuitive. An increase in either the 
markup z  or R&D productivity ϕ  improves the incentives for R&D and hence increases R&D 
labor. A larger discount rate decreases the present value of an invention and the incentives for 
R&D. As leisure becomes more important (i.e. a larger φ ), labor supply decreases; as a result, 
R&D labor also decreases. Finally, a larger wealth share of country h reduces its households’ 
marginal utility of wealth and their labor supply; consequently, R&D labor decreases. 
 
Proposition 1: A decrease in the wealth share of country h stimulates innovation and growth. 
Proof: See (16) and (19).■ 
 
We next analyze the relationship between global wealth inequality and growth. It can be 
shown that the variance of national wealth share is 2)5.0( −= vv sσ . The square root of vσ  is the 
coefficient of variation of wealth that is a common measure of wealth inequality. Given that vσ  
is an U-shape function in vs  and growth is decreasing in vs , we have the following result.  
 
Proposition 2: When country h owns more (less) than half the wealth in the world, growth and 
global wealth inequality are negatively (positively) related. 
Proof: See Figure 2.■ 
 
 We next examine the effects of global wealth redistribution on welfare. Specifically, we 
would like to know whether a decrease in the wealth share of country h can increase its 
households’ welfare. Given the balanced-growth behavior of the economy, (1) simplifies to  
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(20) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+= jjj gCU lln)1(ln1 0 φραρ , 
where 00 CsC c
h = , 00 )1( CsC cl −=  and αα )()( 100 LHZC x −= . Substituting these conditions into (20) 
and dropping the exogenous 0Z  yield  
(21) hxc
h gHLsU lln)1(ln)1(lnln. φραααρ +−+−++=  
for households in country h. As for households in country l, replace cs  by cs−1  and hl  by ll . 
Differentiating (21) with respect to vs  yields  
(22) 
321
l
l321321321321
+−−++
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂=∂
∂
v
h
h
vv
x
xvv
c
cv
h
ss
g
s
H
Hs
L
Ls
s
ss
U φ
ρ
αααρ 111 .17 
 A redistribution of wealth from country h to country l (i.e. a decrease in vs ) would 
decrease country h households’ share of global consumption cs  and their leisure 
hl  that lead to a 
welfare loss in country h. However, it would also increase xH  and rH  that raise global output 
and growth respectively; as a result, they lead to a welfare gain. As for lL l−=1 , there are 
opposing effects from a smaller vs . On one hand, the increase in vs−1  would increase the leisure 
of households in country l and reduce their labor supply at a given wage. On the other hand, the 
increase in xH  increases the marginal product of L  and hence 
l
tW . It turns out that the wealth 
effect dominates the wage effect so that the overall effect on L  is negative. Although there are 
different effects of vs  on 
hU , Proposition 3 shows that if the discount rate ρ  is sufficiently low 
or R&D productivity ϕ  is sufficiently high, then the growth effect dominates other effects such 
that 0/ <∂∂ vh sU . In this case, country h surprisingly benefits from giving away some of their 
                                                 
17 The signs of these derivatives will be derived in the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix A. 
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wealth to country l because the equilibrium growth rate is inefficiently low. As for country l, 
Proposition 3 shows that if country h benefits from transferring some of their wealth to country l, 
then country l must also benefit from this transfer. 
 
Proposition 3: If ρ  is sufficiently small or ϕ  is sufficiently large, then wealth redistribution 
from country h to country l (i.e. a decrease in vs ) would increase the welfare of both countries. 
Proof: See Appendix A.■ 
 
 To have a better understanding of Proposition 3, we derive the Pareto efficient allocation 
of R&D labor. We consider the case in which the social planner directly chooses the allocations 
to maximize lh UU )1(. θθ −+ , where )1,0(∈θ  is an exogenous preference weight on country h. 
 
Lemma 5: The Pareto efficient allocation of R&D labor is  
(23) 
z
Hr ln
1
1
1~ ϕ
ρ
α
φθ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−−= . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■ 
 
In the proof of Lemma 5, we also compare (19) and (23) and find that a small value of ϕρ /  is a 
sufficient condition for rr HH >~  (i.e. R&D underinvestment), in which case the wealth transfer 
that stimulates innovation could lead to a Pareto improvement. 
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5. Conclusion 
Although this study analyzes global wealth redistribution through the effects on innovation in the 
donating country, anti-poverty aid also carries other benefits, such as building up productive 
public infrastructure, for the aid-receiving countries.18 Even focusing on the innovation effect in 
the donating country, this study suggests that international transfers can increase innovation and 
growth, reduce global inequality and possibly lead to a Pareto improvement. Therefore, critiques 
of anti-poverty aid may want to take into account the benefits for the US. 
 To derive closed-form solutions, we have kept the model simple and tractable. For 
example, we consider an exogenous trade pattern (i.e. the high-income country produces 
innovative goods while the low-income country produces homogenous goods) in order to 
highlight the effects of innovation in the high-income country. Furthermore, this simplification 
allows the open-economy model with two countries to be viewed as a closed-economy model 
with two types of households, so that the redistribution effects are readily comparable with the 
inequality-innovation literature that is based on a closed-economy setting. Also, the present study 
assumes that the aid-receiving country produces non-innovative goods without the possibility of 
imitation, technology transfer through multinational firms, and domestic innovation. This setup 
reflects the reality of providing anti-poverty aid to the least developed countries that have limited 
capacity to engage in the kind of (a) imitative R&D analyzed in Grossman and Helpman (1991b), 
(b) adaptive R&D for technology transfer analyzed in Dinopoulous and Segerstrom (2009) and 
(c) innovative R&D analyzed in Grossman and Lai (2004). Finally, the issue of scale effects is 
set aside by normalizing the supply of labor in the high-income country to unity so that it is the 
                                                 
18 See, for example, Chatterjee et al. (2003) and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007) for recent studies on this issue. 
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share of labor devoted to R&D that determines growth as in the second-generation R&D-based 
endogenous-growth model.19 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Lemma 1: Substituting (3) into (2) and aggregating the resulting expression for the two 
countries yield   
(A1) tt
l
t
h
tttt CPWWVRV )1( φ+−++=& . 
We next derive a relationship between ltW  and ttCP . Combining 
l
tt
l
t
l
t CPW .φ=l  from (3) and 
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l
t
l
t
l
t CPLWW .)1( α==− l  from the homogenous-goods share of output yields  
(A2) ttc
l
t CPsW ])1([ αφ +−= , 
where t
l
ttc CCs /1 , ≡−  is stationary as implied by (4). Taking the log of tttt VCP /≡Ω  and then 
differentiating with respect to time yields  
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Substituting (4), (11), (A1) and (A2) into (A3) yields (12).■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: The profit share of output is zzCP tttx /)1()1(, −−= απ . Given that tΩ  is 
constant from Lemma 1, ttCP  and tV  must grow at the same (possibly zero) rate. Applying this 
condition and (4) to (9) yields )/(, ttxtV λρπ += . Using these conditions, we can derive that  
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V
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Therefore, if tΩ  is constant, then trt H ,.ϕλ =  must also be constant.■ 
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Proof of Lemma 3: From its definition, the law of motion for t
h
ttv VVs /, ≡  is given by 
(A5) 
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where the second equality uses (2), (3) and (A1). Substituting (11) and (A2) into (A5) and then 
performing a few steps of mathematical manipulation yield  
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Substituting tttt VCP /≡Ω   into (A6) yields (17).■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 4: Choosing htW  as the numeraire implies that ϕϕ /1/ == htt WV  for all t so 
that 0=tV& . The stationarity of the wealth distribution implies that lthtt VVV &&& == . Imposing these 
conditions, (4) and (11) on (2) yields  
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h
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where lt
h
t
l
tt WWW =≡ /ω  is the relative wage (to be determined below). Substituting (11), (A7) 
and (A8) into (3) yields  
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Country h’s labor share of output is zCPHW tttx
h
t /)1(, α−= , and the profit share of output is 
zzCP tttx /)1()1(, −−= απ . Applying these conditions, )/(, ttxtV λρπ +=  and trt H ,.ϕλ =  to (11) 
yields  
(A11) ϕρ /)1( ,, +=− trtx HHz . 
Combining (A9), (A11) and httrtx HH l−=+ 1,,  yields  
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Combining zCPHW tttx
h
t /)1(, α−=  and tttlt CPLW .α=  yields  
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where the last equality is obtained by using lttL l−=1 , (A10) and (A13). Finally, combining (13), 
(17) and 0, =tvs&  yields  
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Note that if vs  equals one, then α−=1cs . Furthermore, as vs  decreases, cs  also decreases.■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: Using (A15), we can show that 
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Also, vc ss ∂∂ /ln  approaches zero as 0→ρ  or ∞→ϕ . Using (A13), we can show that  
 - 25 -
(A17) 01
1
1)1(
1
ln)1( . <⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
+−=∂
∂− ϕ
ρ
ϕ
ρφφϕ
αρ
φ
φα v
v
x s
s
H . 
Note that Condition R implies 0/1 . >− ϕφρ vs . Also, vx sH ∂∂ /ln  approaches zero as 0→ρ  or 
∞→ϕ . Using (A12), we can show that  
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which is independent of ρ  and ϕ . Using (A9), we can show that  
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which approaches zero as 0→ρ  or ∞→ϕ . Using (A10) and lL l−=1 , we can show that  
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As for vs∂∂ /ω , we can use (A14) to show that  
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Substituting (A14) and (A21) into (A20) shows that vsL ∂∂ /ln  is positive and approaches zero as 
0→ρ  or ∞→ϕ . Therefore, if either ρ  is sufficiently low or ϕ  is sufficiently large, then the 
growth effect of wealth redistribution dominates the other effects such that country h benefits 
from transferring some wealth to country l. As for country l’s welfare, 
(A22) 
321
l
l3213213214434421
−−−+−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
−−=∂
∂
v
l
l
vv
x
xvv
c
cv
l
ss
g
s
H
Hs
L
Ls
s
ss
U φ
ρ
αααρ 11
1
1 . 
Comparing (22) and (A22) shows that 0/ <∂∂ vh sU  is a sufficient condition for 0/ <∂∂ vl sU .■ 
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Proof of Lemma 5: The social planner chooses hC0 , 
lC0 , 
hl , ll  and xH  to maximize 
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(A24) and (A25) imply that 0/1 C=μ . Then, combining this condition with hrx HH l−=+ 1  , 
(A26) and (A28) yields (23). Comparing (19) and (23) yields  
(A29) ϕ
ρ
φ
φ
α
φθφ 4444444 34444444 21444 344 21
B
v
A
rr sz
z
zz
zz
zz
zHH ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
+−
−+−>⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−⇔>
>
1
1ln
ln
ln
1
1
1
1
11~
0
. 
There are two cases to consider. First, if 0>B , then BA // <φρ  is equivalent to rr HH >~ . 
Second, if 0<B , then rr HH >~  always holds. This second case becomes more likely to occur as 
z  increases because B  is decreasing in z .■ 
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